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Objective: The avoidance of mental effort is a symptom criterion for Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), but the experience of mental effort has received
relatively little attention in the empirical study of individuals at-risk for ADHD. We explored
a novel method to assess the experience of effort and discomfort during a working
memory task in a sample of young adults at-risk and not at-risk for ADHD.
Method: A sample of 235 undergraduate students (Mean age = 21.02, 86 males) were
included in this study. Based on an ADHD-screener (ASRS), 136 participants met criteria
for the ADHD-risk group and 99 were in the non-ADHD risk group.
Results: Individuals at-risk for ADHD reported higher mental effort and discomfort than
individuals not at-risk for ADHD, even when performance on the working memory task
was comparable or statistically controlled. Mental effort required and discomfort were
more strongly correlated for at-risk compared to not at-risk participants. Individuals at-
risk for ADHD displayed a stronger correlation between mental effort required and actual
accuracy, but individuals not at-risk for ADHD displayed a stronger association between
perceived accuracy and actual accuracy for the hardest experimental conditions. The
most intense moment of effort required predicted retrospective discomfort ratings of the
task in the ADHD-risk group, but not in the non-risk group.
Conclusion: The subjective experience of in the moment mental effort is an important
and viable construct that should be more carefully defined and measured. In particular,
the experience of effort required (or how taxing a task is) differentiated between
individuals at-risk and individuals not at-risk for ADHD in the present study. Whereas
previous ADHD research has explored effort exerted, the present work demonstrated
that investigating the experience of being mentally taxed might provide a productive line
of investigation that could be used to advance our understanding of the cognitive and
affective mechanisms underlying the regulation of effort in individuals at-risk of ADHD.
Keywords: experience of effort, mental effort, subjective ratings, ADHD-risk, cognitive abilities
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INTRODUCTION
The point of departure for the present work is the observation
that there are individual differences in how mentally effortful
tasks are experienced. For some, a cognitively demanding task is
a welcomed opportunity, for others such a task can’t end soon
enough. Individual differences are evident in both what it feels
like ‘in the moment’ to complete a mentally effortful task (e.g.,
this task is requiring a lot of effort; see for example, Paas, 1992;
von Helversen et al., 2008; Robinson and Morsella, 2014) and
‘generalized thoughts and feelings’ about mental effort (e.g., I often
find math questions require a lot of effort; see for example, Dornic
et al., 1991; Cacioppo et al., 1996). This difference between effort
in the moment and generalized thoughts and feelings largely
maps onto the classic distinction between states and traits. In this
study, we focused on measuring the “in the moment” experience
of effort during a cognitively demanding task. In addition, we
identified individuals at-risk for Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD), as avoidance of effortful tasks is diagnostic
of these individuals (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association
[APA], 2013). We examined differences between those at-risk
for ADHD and those not at-risk in terms of their experience of
mental effort during a cognitive demanding task, and whether
these differences were separable from task performance.
The ‘in the moment’ versus ‘generalized thoughts and feelings’
about mental effort distinction provides some conceptual clarity
for understanding the experience of mental effort, but there
is still a long way to go in defining this construct in a more
precise manner for proper empirical investigation. In part, this
is because the experience of mental effort is a broad and often
ill-defined concept with a variety of different aspects. Like the
proverbial blind men, researchers have grasped different aspects
of the elephant and come to different understandings. There are
at least three distinct aspects of mental effort that need to be
distinguished in participants’ subjective self-reports. Participants
can report ‘how hard I tried’ (i.e., effort volitionally exerted);
‘how taxed I felt’ (i.e., effort extracted for level of achievement)
and ‘how difficult the task is’ (i.e., effort potentially demanded).
The key difference between ‘how hard I tried’ and ‘how taxed I
felt’ relates to agency. The first puts the emphasis on what one
brings to the task; that is, one’s level of motivation and energy to
do one’s best, or not. Whereas the second puts the emphasis on
what the task does to the individual; that is, how much the task
burdened or required of the individual. It is possible to imagine
situations where a person might report trying hard to do their
best but also report finding that the task did not require a lot
of them. This conceptual distinction has borne out empirically.
For example, Mulert et al. (2007) found that amount of “effort
required” (i.e., how taxed I felt) varied in direct proportion to
objective task difficulty, whereas amount of “volitional effort”
(i.e., how hard I tried) was more constant across variations in
task difficulty. The key difference between ‘how taxed I felt’ and
‘how difficult the task is’ is whether the focus is on the burden
experienced by the individual or on the external task and its
characteristics. The first puts the emphasis on what the task does
to the individual (how much the task burdened or required of me),
whereas the second puts the emphasis on characteristics of the
task (whether it is difficult relative to other possible tasks). It is
possible to imagine situations where a person might report feeling
very taxed and report that the task was not very difficult; perhaps
they did not get a good night of sleep and are thus very inattentive,
but recognize that relative to other tasks this one is actually not
that difficult. This conceptual distinction has also been borne
out empirically. For example, Otto et al. (2014) found that the
ratings of mental effort (i.e., how taxed I felt) were associated
with increased activation in the left anterior insular cortex (aIC)
compared to ratings of task difficulty (i.e., how difficult the task
is) during a working memory task. Taken as a whole, there are
conceptual and empirical reasons to believe that investigators
studying mental effort must take care to distinguish between
these different aspects of the experience of mental effort.
Mental effort is central to the definition of ADHD,
surprisingly, however, this topic has garnered relatively little
systematic research. One of the ADHD criterion stipulates that
an individual with ADHD: “often avoids, dislikes, or is reluctant
to engage in tasks that require sustained mental effort (e.g.,
schoolwork or homework; for older adolescents and adults,
preparing reports, completing forms, reviewing lengthy papers).”
(p. 59, American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Given
the requirement for pervasiveness of signs and symptoms in
order to obtain a diagnosis of ADHD, this diagnostic criterion
suggests a dispositional quality related to avoidance of effort in
individuals with ADHD. The Brown Scale is a standardized tool
that was developed to provide a broader clinical characterization
of the inattentive symptoms and executive problems associated
with ADHD (Brown, 1996). This measure includes an Effort
Scale, defined by inconsistent energy and inconsistent sustained
effort. It appears that the Effort Scale is assessing something akin
to the ‘how hard I (typically) try’ aspect of mental effort given
that items suggest a lack of energy and a failure to work to
potential. Adolescents with ADHD have reported more difficulty
sustaining effort as indicated by significant differences on the
Effort Scale compared to an adolescent control group (Rucklidge
and Tannock, 2002). Similarly, the Cognitive and Motivation in
Everyday Life (CAMEL) Scale (Van Liefferinge et al., 2016), which
assesses neuropsychological impairments in children and youth
with ADHD, appears to tap into the ‘how hard I (typically) try’
aspect of mental effort. Sample items from the Effort Allocation
Scale of the CAMEL are: “Takes time to warm-up – to get going
on a task”; “Puts things off until the last minute,” and “Chooses
the way with least effort.” Parents were asked to rate their children
and youth based on the extent to which the items described
their children’s behavior using a five-point Likert scale. Children
with ADHD scored significantly lower on this scale compared
to children in the community sample, demonstrating a medium
effect size, indicating difficulties with effort allocation in the
clinical group.
Sergeant’s (2000, 2005) cognitive-energetic model has
proposed a role for state effort in explaining ADHD deficits. In
this model, effort is conceptualized as a state factor (including
arousal and activation), which is separable from computational
mechanisms (such as encoding, search, decision, and motor
organization) and management or evaluation mechanisms
(related to executive functions). Specifically, effort is defined as
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“the necessary energy to meet the demands of a task” (Sergeant,
2000, p. 8). In this model, task demands are thought to impact
effort, whereby greater cognitive load elicits greater mobilization
of energy (or effort). Relatively little research has examined
the energetic state component of Sergeant’s model. However,
children with ADHD have been shown to perform more poorly
in tasks with slow compared to fast event rates (Sergeant et al.,
1999). Unlike previous research on ADHD and mental effort,
Sergeant’s model focuses on state ‘in the moment’ effort. But like
previous ADHD research, this model appears to be focusing on
the ‘how hard I tried’ aspect of mental effort. That is, suggesting
that individuals with ADHD struggle to mobilize and volitionally
exert the effort needed, especially on tasks that are de-energizing.
Given that avoidance of mentally effortful tasks is a diagnostic
criterion of ADHD, it is somewhat surprising that relatively
little systematic research has been done on the topic. Most
of the research has focused on ratings of general thoughts,
feelings and dispositions and even more specifically trait
dispositions regarding how hard individuals try to complete
mentally effortful tasks. A smaller amount of work, largely
centered around Sergeant’s theory, has modeled a key role for
in the moment considerations focusing on how much effort is
exerted. To our knowledge, no research has examined whether
individuals with ADHD or related difficulties systematically
differ in their experience of ‘how taxed’ they are by cognitive
tasks compared to non-ADHD individuals. Given that many
theories of mental effort postulate that the experience of being
mentally taxed may serve as a regulatory signal to disengage
from effortful tasks (e.g., Kurzban, 2016), investigating the
experience of being mentally taxed in individuals with ADHD-
related difficulties may prove to be a productive focus of
investigation that could be used to advance our understanding
of the regulation of effort in at-risk samples. Thus, the
overarching goal of the present work was to systematically
describe how the subjective experience of mental effort required
(i.e., experience of being burdened or taxed) is different for
individuals at-risk for ADHD compared to those not at-risk for
ADHD.
In the current study, we modeled our experimental design
and data analytic approach on a pain study completed by
Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996). During colonoscopy and
lithotripsy medical procedures (which were painful procedures at
the time their study was conducted), Redelmeier and Kahneman
(1996) asked participants to report their level of pain every
60 s. Then, within 1 h of completing the medical procedure,
participants were asked to recall the total amount of pain
they experienced. These authors found that the most intense
ratings of pain during the procedure and the final ratings
of pain at the end of the procedure were the most robust
predictors of retrospective ratings – this phenomenon has come
to be called the ‘peak-end effect.’ In a review of research
on the ‘peak-end’ effect, Fredrickson (2000) argued that the
broader principle is that moments of personal significance or
salience are the best predictors of recall, and that peak and
final moments are typically salient for most people. Applying
this methodology from the pain literature, we assessed how
taxed and uncomfortable participants felt during the completion
of a cognitively demanding task and how uncomfortable
participants recall the task to be after it was completed. We
also measured their actual performance and their perceived
performance.
We examined whether individuals at-risk for ADHD would
find a cognitively demanding task more taxing (i.e., effort
required) and uncomfortable than individuals not at-risk for
ADHD. Specifically, we used an in the moment methodology that
provides a specific reference point to a cognitively demanding
task for these ratings. We asked participants to rate the effort
required and discomfort at regular intervals during this task.
We predicted that the at-risk group would rate the task as
requiring more effort and as more uncomfortable than the non-
risk group, even when performance accuracy was comparable
in both groups. Further, if effort required and discomfort is
more salient in the at-risk group these ratings should be more
strongly associated with performance accuracy among the at-risk
group than in the non-risk group. Finally, given our predictions
regarding the salience of effort required and discomfort in the
at-risk group, we predicted that the most intense (or peak
ratings) of effort required would be particularly strong predictors
of the at-risk group’s retrospective memories of discomfort
associated with the working memory task. Given the novelty of
the methodology used in this study, we examined our hypotheses
in extreme groups that were identified using cut-offs on an
ADHD symptom screening measure (at-risk ADHD and non-
risk ADHD groups).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
The experimental protocol was approved by the Human
Participants Review Committee of York University’s Office of
Research Ethics. Written, informed consent was obtained from all
participants at the very beginning of the research protocol before
any data was collected. Participants were free to withdraw consent
at any time and still receive course credit.
Participants
A sample of 235 participants (Mean age = 21.02, SD = 5.69,
86 males) was selected for inclusion in this study from a larger
sample of 431 university undergraduate students (mean age:
20.59, SD: 4.97, age range: 17–55, female: 68%) who participated
in a larger study for course credit. Data from 30 participants were
excluded from the analyses for the following reasons: participants
failed the practice trials on the working memory task, participants
were deemed to be outliers due to excessively poor performance
on the working memory task (i.e., accuracy at any block was
more than three standard deviations away from the mean of the
blocks with the same difficulty) or participants had incomplete
or missing data. Some data from these participants are reported
in another study addressing different questions (Hsu et al.,
unpublished).
In the present study, we used the adult ADHD Self-Report
Symptom Checklist screener (ASRS, Kessler et al., 2005) to
identify extreme groups, so that we could compare participants
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with ADHD-related difficulties to participants who are not
at-risk. Namely, participants who scored above the threshold on
four or more items were identified as at-risk of ADHD, and
participants who score above the threshold on one or zero items
were classified as not at-risk. Based on this ASRS screening
criterion, we selected 136 at-risk participants (mean age: 20.49,
SD = 5.20, 49 males) and 99 not at-risk participants (mean
age: 21.77, SD = 6.26, 37 males) for the ADHD non-risk group
resulting in a total of 235 participants for final analysis. The two
groups did not differ in age and gender (all p > 0.05).
Measures
Working Memory Task
We used an adapted version of the Paced Auditory Serial
Addition Test (PASAT, Gronwall, 1977) to elicit mental effort.
In this task digits were visually presented on a computer
screen, one at a time, in a continuous stream. Participants were
asked to continuously add the numerical digits. Each digit was
presented on the screen for 1 s. An orienting auditory beep
was simultaneously presented with each digit. The delay between
the offset of one digit and the onset of the next digit was 4 s.
Participants were instructed to sum the last two digits they had
seen and to enter their response using a keyboard. Participants
were able to respond as soon as the latest digit appeared and
during the 4 s delay; thus, within a response window of 5 s.
Each ‘block’ required participants to provide a total of 15 sums
(i.e., 15 trials with a total of 16 digits presented). The task had
five conditions differing in duration, i.e., the number of blocks
ranging from five to nine blocks. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of five conditions. Each block was one of three
levels of difficulty – easy, medium or hard. Task difficulty was
randomly varied within participants such that each participant
received one easy block, one hard block, and three to seven
medium difficulty blocks depending on the duration condition
completed. The blocks were presented in a pseudo-randomized
sequence, such that the first and last blocks were always medium
difficulty. The intervening blocks were composed of one easy, one
hard, and one to five medium blocks. The hard trials involved
adding one single and one double digit. The medium trials
involved adding two single digits that summed to more than nine.
The easy trials involved adding two single digits that summed to
nine or less.
At the start of the PASAT participants completed two practice
blocks of medium difficulty to ensure they fully comprehended
the task and to familiarize them with the task demands. Following
the practice blocks, participants were asked some questions
regarding their anticipated experience of the task (including how
much mental effort they expected would be required to complete
the task and how much discomfort they expected during the
task; the data on these questions were not examined in this
study). After each block of trials, participants were required to
rate their experience of effort and discomfort. Specifically, the
questions were (1) “Rate your current level of mental effort”
(1 = None; 7 = A lot) and (2) “Rate your current level of
discomfort or distress” (1 = None; 7 = A lot). These scores are
referred to as ‘real-time’ mental effort and discomfort ratings
as they were obtained during the PASAT. After completing
the PASAT task, participants completed a demographic and
self-report questionnaire that was approximately 6 min in
duration. After completing the demographic questionnaire,
participants were required to retrospectively evaluate their
experience with the PASAT task. Specifically, the questions
included (1) “How much mental effort, in total, was required
to complete this working memory task?” (1 = None; 7 = A
lot); (2) “On this working memory task, what was your total
amount of discomfort or distress?” (1 = None; 7 = A lot);
(3) “How well did you perform on the working memory task”
(1= Significantly below average; 7= Significantly above average);
and (4) “How willing would you be to do another working
memory task right now?”(1 = Not at all willing; 7 = Definitely
willing).
Raven’s Progressive Matrices
Advanced items from the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM)
were used to assess participants’ non-verbal intelligence (Raven
et al., 1998). This task contains a series of designs with a missing
part. Participants were instructed to complete the design by
selecting the missing part from eight options. This task had 18
trials in total and a time limit of 15 min. The number of correct
responses was summed such that a higher score indicated higher
non-verbal ability.
ADHD Self-Report Scale
The ADHD self-report scale (ASRS) screener was developed
by Kessler et al. (2005) and is based on symptoms of ADHD
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (fourth edition). Participants are asked to rate their
level of each symptom based on the last 6 months. Of the 18
symptoms, Kessler et al. (2005) found six items to be highly
predictive of ADHD, and these six items comprise the screener.
Within the six items of the screener, four are based on symptoms
of inattention with the other two based on hyperactivity. Sample
question includes: “How often do you have problems remembering
appointments or obligations?.” It is scored using a five-point Likert
scale (never, rarely, sometimes, often, and very often). Cronbach’s
alpha for this scale was 0.73. Each item has a frequency threshold,
and participants who scored above the threshold on four or more
items were identified as the ADHD-risk group and participants
who scored above the threshold on one or zero items were
identified as the ADHD non-risk group.
Statistical Analyses
In order to examine differences between the ADHD-risk and
non-risk groups, we used independent t-tests to examine
differences in: real-time ratings of mental effort and discomfort,
task performance, slopes of real-time mental effort and
discomfort and non-verbal ability. Pearson’s correlation analyses
were used to examine the relationship between real-time
effort and discomfort and between the average of real-time
mental effort, discomfort, perceived performance and actual
performance on the PASAT separately in the ADHD-risk and
non-risk groups. The group differences in correlations were
examined using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation. Finally, the
association between effort (peak and end) and retrospective
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discomfort were examined separately in the ADHD-risk and non-
risk groups, including regression analyses to examine whether
the most intense ratings of effort interacted with ADHD status
in predicting retrospective ratings of discomfort.
RESULTS
Did the ADHD-Risk and ADHD Non-risk
Group Differ in Their Experience of
Mental Effort?
As evident in Table 1, the ADHD-risk group experienced
a higher level of mental effort and discomfort during the
PASAT. As for the retrospective evaluation, the ADHD-risk
group recalled experiencing a higher level of mental effort and
discomfort compared to the non-risk group. The ADHD-risk
group also reported a significantly lower level of perceived
performance on the PASAT, and was more reluctant to repeat
the task compared to the non-risk group. The ADHD-risk group
performed significantly worse than the non-risk group on the
PASAT, especially on the hard and medium blocks of PASAT.
There was no group difference in accuracy on the easy block.
Effect sizes for each of the comparisons are presented in the final
column, indicating medium to large effect sizes on several of the
group differences related to mental effort and discomfort.
We conducted a univariate ANOVA to examine whether
group differences on both effort required and discomfort
ratings (and separately for real-time and retrospectively)
would remain significant after statistically controlling for mean
performance. Group differences remained significant for both
real-time effort required, F(1,232) = 12.99, p < 0.001, and
retrospective effort required, F(1,232) = 18.89, p < 0.001.
Group differences also remained significant for both real-time
discomfort, F(1,232) = 21.99, p < 0.001, and retrospective
discomfort, F(1, 232)= 26.46, p < 0.001.
The difference in the slopes of real-time mental effort and
discomfort between groups was non-significant, suggesting that
the change of effort and discomfort over time were comparable
between the two groups. There was also no significant difference
in non-verbal ability for the ADHD-risk group and the non-
ADHD risk group.
In addition, we examined group differences in the magnitude
of the correlations between real-time effort and real-time
TABLE 1 | Differences between the Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) non-risk and ADHD-risk groups.
Control n = 99 Mean (SD) ADHD-risk n = 136 Mean (SD) t (233) Cohen’s d
Real-time effort
Average 4.23 (1.18) 4.88 (1.26) −4.00∗∗∗ 0.53
Hard block 5.02 (1.48) 5.64 (1.39) −3.29∗∗∗ 0.43
Medium block 4.15 (1.23) 4.80 (1.30) −3.86∗∗∗ 0.51
Easy block 3.83 (1.50) 4.46 (1.75) −2.99∗∗ 0.39
Peak 5.44 (1.20) 6.00 (1.15) −3.60∗∗∗ 0.48
End 4.05 (1.54) 4.74 (1.73) −3.22∗∗ 0.42
Real-time discomfort
Average 3.11 (1.45) 4.15 (1.58) −5.15∗∗∗ 0.69
Hard block 3.72 (1.84) 4.89 (1.88) −4.77∗∗∗ 0.63
Medium block 3.04 (1.47) 4.06 (1.59) −5.02∗∗∗ 0.67
Easy block 2.79 (1.54) 3.76 (1.95) −4.26∗∗∗ 0.55
Peak 4.19 (1.89) 5.33 (1.74) −4.78∗∗∗ 0.63
End 3.07 (1.58) 4.12 (1.99) −4.33∗∗∗ 0.58
PASAT accuracy
Average 0.79 (0.16) 0.74 (0.15) 2.38∗ 0.32
Hard block 0.66 (0.25) 0.58 (0.23) 2.43∗ 0.33
Medium block 0.80 (0.17) 0.75 (0.16) 2.12∗ 0.30
Easy block 0.85 (0.17) 0.81 (0.20) 1.27 0.22
Slope
Real-time effort (Z) −0.03 (0.23) −0.04 (0.30) 0.37 0.04
Real-time discomfort (Z) 0.03 (0.26) 0.02 (0.32) 0.23 0.03
Retrospective ratings
Remembered effort 4.53 (1.42) 5.35 (1.28) −4.67∗∗∗ 0.61
Remembered discomfort 3.38 (1.54) 4.60 (1.74) −5.54∗∗∗ 0.74
Perceived performance 4.47 (1.20) 3.79 (1.35) −4.04∗∗∗ 0.53
Willing to repeat task 3.86 (1.92) 3.17 (2.02) 2.64∗∗ 0.35
Non-verbal ability
Non-verbal ability 5.88 (2.80) 5.88 (3.40) −0.01 0
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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TABLE 2 | Correlations between average real-time mental effort and cognitive performance for the ADHD-risk and ADHD non-risk groups.
ADHD non-risk
n = 99 Mean (SD)
ADHD-risk n = 136
Mean (SD)
Fisher’s Z
Real-time average effort and actual accuracy
Effort (x¯) and actual accuracy (x¯) −0.12 −0.20∗ 0.61
Effort (x¯) and actual accuracy (hard) −0.06 −0.29∗∗∗ 1.78∗
Effort (x¯) and actual accuracy (medium) −0.15 −0.17 0.15
Effort (x¯) and actual accuracy (easy) −0.01 −0.05 0.30
Real-time average discomfort and actual accuracy
Discomfort (x¯) and actual accuracy (x¯) −0.14 −0.25∗ 0.85
Discomfort (x¯) and actual accuracy (hard) −0.08 −0.31∗∗∗ 1.79∗
Discomfort (x¯) and actual accuracy (medium) −0.17 −0.19∗ 0.15
Discomfort (x¯) and actual accuracy (easy) −0.03 −0.21∗ 1.37
Perceived accuracy and actual accuracy
Perceived accuracy and actual accuracy (x¯) 0.39∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 1.25
Perceived accuracy and actual accuracy (hard) 0.49∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 1.69∗
Perceived accuracy and actual accuracy (medium) 0.36∗∗∗ 0.22∗ 1.14
Perceived accuracy and actual accuracy (easy) 0.13 0.07 0.45
Asterisk indicated the significance of correlation coefficients within each group, where ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Two-tailed Z-critical is 1.96 for p < 0.05;
One-tailed Z-critical is 1.65 for p < 0.05.
discomfort ratings. The size of this correlation was r = 0.43,
p < 0.001 in the non-risk group and the size of this correlation
was r = 0.62, p < 0.001 in the ADHD-risk group. The correlation
between real-time mental effort and discomfort was significantly
higher within the ADHD-risk group as compared to the non-risk
group (Fisher’s Z = 1.98, p < 0.05).
Does the Relation between Subjective
Experience and Task Performance Differ
between ADHD Non-risk and ADHD-risk
Groups?
Table 2 compares correlations between average real-time mental
effort required and task performance for the ADHD-risk and
non-risk groups. The ADHD-risk group showed significant
correlations between average real-time ratings of mental effort
required and performance accuracy on the PASAT, indicating
that more effort required was associated with lower accuracy.
Alternatively, the non-risk group did not show significant
correlations between average real-time mental effort required
and performance accuracy. The magnitude of the correlation
between average real-time mental effort and PASAT accuracy
in the hard condition was significantly larger in the ADHD-
risk group compared to the non-risk group based on a one-
tailed Z test, Fisher’s Z (1, N = 235) = 1.78, p < 0.05. Thus,
taken together, the relation between real-time mental effort
required and task performance appears to be more robust for
the ADHD-risk group than in the non-risk group, especially
in the most difficult condition. We obtained parallel findings
when we examined associations between ratings of discomfort
and performance accuracy, and this difference between groups
was also statistically significant in the most difficult condition,
Fisher’s Z (1, N = 235) = 1.79, p < 0.05. We also examined
the association between perceived performance and actual
performance in each group. Both groups displayed significant
positive correlations, but the correlation for the non-risk
group was significantly larger than for the ADHD-risk group
in the difficult condition, Fisher’s Z (1, N = 235) = 1.69,
p < 0.05.
Do Peak and End Real-time Mental Effort
Differentially Predict Retrospective
Discomfort in the ADHD-risk and
Non-risk Groups?
Table 3 presents the results of two simultaneous multiple
regression analyses using peak and end real-time effort required
predicting retrospective discomfort, one conducted in the ADHD
non-risk sample and the other conducted in the ADHD risk
sample. While the overall models were significant for both
groups, the peak real-time effort required was a significant
predictor in the ADHD-risk group but not in the non-risk group.
Table 4 presents the result of a simultaneous multiple
regression analysis using ADHD group status, peak effort
required and the interaction between ADHD group status and
peak effort required predicting retrospective discomfort. The
result showed that ADHD group status (β = 0.24, p < 0.001),
peak effort required (β = .33, p < 0.001), and the interaction
(β = .20, p < 0.05) were significant predictors. The interaction
between group status and peak effort required indicates that
the most intense moment of effort required was particularly
salient in defining retrospective discomfort for those at-risk for
ADHD.
Length of Task
We examined the correlation between length of the task
(number of blocks) with each of our variables, including
accuracy and ratings of effort and discomfort, both in the
full sample and within each group. We found that length of
task did not systematically vary with any of these variables in
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TABLE 3 | Simultaneous multiple regression analyses predicting the
retrospective discomfort with real-time measures of effort in ADHD
non-risk and ADHD-risk samples.
DV: Retrospective
discomfort
Regression #1
ADHD non-risk
(n = 99) β′
Regression #2
ADHD-risk
(n = 136) β′
Peak real-time effort 0.22 0.45∗∗∗
End real-time effort 0.25∗ 0.21∗
Adjusted r2 = 0.16∗∗∗ Adjusted r2 = 0.35∗∗∗
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
TABLE 4 | Simultaneous multiple regression analysis predicting the
retrospective discomfort with real-time effort, ADHD group status and
peak effort by ADHD group status.
DV: Retrospective discomfort Whole sample (n = 235) β′
ADHD group status 0.24∗∗∗
Peak real-time effort 0.33∗∗∗
Peak real-time effort by ADHD group status 0.20∗
Adjusted r2 = 0.34∗∗∗
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
the full sample, in the control group or in the ADHD-risk
group.
DISCUSSION
In the current study, we examined individual differences in the
experience of mental effort. Specifically, we asked participants at-
risk for ADHD and participants not at-risk for ADHD to rate
effort required and discomfort during a cognitively demanding
task. We found that the ADHD-risk group reported higher levels
of mental effort required (i.e., how taxed they felt) and discomfort
during the PASAT working memory task, and these differences
remained significant even after controlling for task performance.
Individuals at-risk for ADHD were also less willing to do the
working memory task again compared to the non-ADHD risk
group.
The positive correlations observed between real-time ratings
of effort and discomfort in both the ADHD-risk and control
non-risk groups are consistent with the idea that the experience
of effort is unpleasant and aversive (Stanovich, 2009, 2011;
Kahneman, 2011; Kurzban et al., 2013). Researchers have
suggested that effortful tasks tend to trigger an unpleasant,
aversive state because human cognitive system naturally seeks
to minimize the expenditure of effort (Kurzban et al., 2013).
In this sense cognitive demands are evaluated as being costly
and typically trigger avoidance coping behaviors (Botvinick,
2007). Importantly, however, the experience of effort required
was more strongly associated with discomfort for individuals
at-risk for ADHD than for the non-risk group, as indicated
by the significant difference in the size of the correlations
between effort and discomfort ratings. Moreover, we found
that average real-time effort and retrospective effort differed
significantly in the at-risk and non-risk groups even after
controlling for task performance. These findings are consistent
with the theoretical literature in suggesting that the experience of
a cognitively demanding task may be especially uncomfortable
and effortful for individuals who struggle with ADHD-related
difficulties (Brown, 1996; Sergeant, 2000; Rucklidge and Tannock,
2002; Van Liefferinge et al., 2016). In summary, individuals
at-risk for ADHD experienced the working memory task to
require more effort and to be more uncomfortable, even
after controlling for task performance; and they also found
the experience of effort and discomfort to be more strongly
correlated.
The ADHD-risk group showed significant correlations
between average real-time ratings of mental effort required and
accuracy, but the non-risk group did not display significant
correlations between average real-time effort required and
performance accuracy. Similarly the ADHD risk group showed
significant correlations between average real-time ratings of
discomfort and accuracy, but the non-risk group did not display
significant correlations between discomfort and accuracy. These
differences between the at-risk and not at-risk groups were most
pronounced for the hardest experimental conditions. Namely,
in the hardest experimental conditions, the experience of effort
required and discomfort were more tightly associated with actual
performance accuracy for the at-risk group compared to the non-
risk group. In contrast, in the hardest experimental conditions the
perception of performance and actual accuracy were more tightly
associated for the non-risk group compared to the at-risk group.
Taken together, these results suggest the best subjective report
for predicting actual performance on particularly challenging
working memory tasks is perceived performance for the non-
risk participants; whereas the at-risk participants are less accurate
in their perception of how well they are doing. For the at-
risk group, perceptions of performance and the experience of
effort and discomfort were similarly related to actual accuracy.
These sets of associations suggest that some type of moment-
to-moment tracking of actual performance is happening during
the task, but that what is being tracked may differ across groups.
These intercorrelations among the effort, discomfort, perceived
performance, and actual accuracy in each group may provide
some further insights into understanding the differences between
each group.
Peak real-time effort required was a significant predictor of
retrospective discomfort in the ADHD-risk group but not in
the non-risk group. Moreover, the interaction between ADHD
group status and peak effort predicted retrospective discomfort,
suggesting that the ADHD-risk group’s most intense experience
of effort required was highly related to their memory of
discomfort. That peak effort required interacted with ADHD-risk
group status suggests that moments of peak effort are particularly
significant and salient for individuals at-risk for ADHD and thus
may be particularly defining for these individuals when they recall
tasks (see review by Fredrickson, 2000). We, however, did not
find evidence to suggest that the final moments of a cognitively
demanding task are differentially salient in determining task
recollection for individuals at-risk of ADHD compared to those
not at-risk. It may be that endings are equally salient for those
at-risk for ADHD compared to those that are not at-risk.
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In our view it will be fruitful to explore the in the moment
experience of mental effort in a more nuanced manner, which
disentangles subjective judgments of effort demanded (how taxed
I felt), effort exerted (how hard I tried), and task difficulty (how
difficult the task is). In particular, these distinctions will be
useful to extend the ADHD literature, which has so far focused
more on trait measures (Brown, 1996; Van Liefferinge et al.,
2016) and on effort exerted in the moment (Sergeant, 2000,
2005). We hope that our study provides a reference point for
the utility of these distinctions in the experience of effort. In
particular, the current findings suggest that individuals at-risk
for ADHD may be characterized by differences in how taxed
they feel during the completion of a cognitively demanding task,
which is meaningfully separate from ratings of task difficulty and
how hard one tries on a given task. Our research contributes
to shifting emphasis from biomedical models that focus on the
pathophysiology of disorders such as ADHD and to models that
focus on the subjective experience and personal agency of the
individual (e.g., Sonuga-Barke and Fairchild, 2012). Similarly,
acknowledging the value and diagnosticity of an individual’s
report of how demanding the task was is consistent with such a
direction.
It is important to acknowledge that our study was based on
a sample of university students, identifying at-risk and non-
risk for ADHD groups. The proportion of at-risk individuals
in our current study was quite high (31.6%) and considerably
higher than prevalence rates of ADHD, which is closer to
rates of 11% (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association [APA],
2013) or 12% (Kessler et al., 2007). However, our proportion
of at-risk participants is in line with other studies that have
used the ASRS as a screening tool in undergraduate samples
for ADHD symptoms (24% such as Turel and Bechara, 2016).
We acknowledge that this is a limitation of our study and
that future studies will be needed in order to bridge our
current findings with the ADHD literature. A critical step will
be to examine these measures in a clinically referred sample
of children, adolescents and adults with diagnosed ADHD.
Studying the experience of mental effort will provide novel ways
to assess the challenges of these individuals, and to develop
new directions to assess and intervene for these individuals.
The more precise language for describing the ways that tasks
impact the individual, which we are advocating here has the
promise to help develop better strategies for the individual
to master tasks that they may find tedious and uninteresting.
For example, thinking of effort as a fluid quality that is
malleable and under the control of the individual, rather
than fixed and defined by the parameters of the task, may
offer promising directions to support students with ADHD
who struggle academically. Such an approach is very much in
line with current mindset interventions for targeting academic
underachievement, such as growth mindset programs (Paunesku
et al., 2015).
In this study, individuals at-risk for ADHD rated the task as
requiring more effort than the ADHD non-risk group. The group
differences in ratings of effort required and discomfort remained
significant after controlling for accuracy. For individuals who
avoid effortful tasks, there may be a unique affective association
that negatively tags their experience of effort, possibly impacting
their motivation for future tasks. Given that many theories of
mental effort postulate that the experience of being mentally
taxed may serve as a regulatory signal to disengage from
effortful tasks (e.g., Kurzban, 2016), investigating the experience
of mental effort demanded during the completion of a cognitively
demanding task in individuals with ADHD-related difficulties
would provide a productive line of investigation that could be
used to advance our understanding of the regulation of effort
exerted in at-risk samples.
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